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ARBITRATION OR LITIGATION?
PRIVATE CHOICE AS A POLITICAL MATTER
By
Ronald A. Brand*
The Federal Arbitration Act and New York Convention solidified U.S. law on
arbitration and have together been read by the courts to result in a strong federal policy
in favor of arbitration. Party autonomy to choose a court for resolution of a private
dispute came later in the United States, but now receives similar deference in the courts,
largely as a result of the 1972 Supreme Court decision in Bremen v. Zapata. What began
as a body of federal common law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments now is found in state statutes and common law which, while uniform on the
surface, is fragmented in its application. The recognition and enforcement of both choice
of court agreements and the resulting judgments would receive treatment similar to that
for arbitral agreements and awards if the United States were to ratify and implement the
2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. But political disagreements
are preventing the U.S. from becoming a party to that Convention, despite widespread
agreement that implementation of its rules would be good for U.S. constituencies.
This paper presents and compares the current framework for enforcement of
choice of forum agreements and the resulting decisions in both the arbitration and
litigation contexts. In doing so, it considers the similarities and differences in the New
York and Hague Conventions that should be considered when choosing a forum in
international commercial contracts. It then considers the decisions (of a political as well
as legal nature) that must be made by states upon entry into either of these treaty
systems—particularly in the form of available declarations. Finally, it considers how the
current U.S. political environment is affecting private international law development and
the implications that process may have for the future.
I.   INTRODUCTION
There was a time when only sovereigns could determine the proper institution to
make decisions that would be enforceable by the state in disputes between private parties.
In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 changed that,1 initiating an era
of party autonomy in choice of forum, with the U.S. Supreme Court consistently finding
a federal policy in favor of arbitration that is strong enough to support—almost without
question—the enforcement of single-party imposition of arbitration agreements in
unbalanced economic relationships.2 U.S. ratification of the New York Convention in

*

Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg University Professor and Academic Director, Center for International
Legal Education, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2016).

2

See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc.v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (holding that an arbitration clause and a class
action waiver clause in non-negotiable DIRECTV service agreement were binding and pre-empted
California state law which otherwise made class action waivers unenforceable).
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1970 extended this policy to consideration of arbitration agreements in international
contracts.3
Party autonomy to choose a court for resolution of a private dispute came later in
the United States. In its 1972 decision in Bremen v. Zapata,4 the Court gave effect to a
contract clause choosing a London court in a contract between German and American
parties. In doing so, the Court stated that “[t]he expansion of American business and
industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a
parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our courts.”5
The Court thus recognized that the parties to an international transaction often have good
reason to provide for a neutral court for the resolution of disputes. Thus, forum selection
clauses “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the
resisting party to be unreasonable under the circumstances.”6
Bremen brought about a policy in the United States favoring the enforcement of
choice of court agreements. While state law has brought about a similarly liberal policy
on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments7—including those emanating
from courts contractually chosen by the parties8—both the Bremen decision and state law
on the recognition of foreign judgments operate only in U.S. courts. Unlike the New
York Convention rules on arbitration, the United States is not a party to a treaty creating
reciprocal recognition and enforcement of U.S. choice of court agreements or U.S.
judgments in foreign courts. While such a treaty is available in the form of the 2005
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (Hague Convention),9 politics
currently prevent its U.S. ratification and implementation.10

3

United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, adopted
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739 (entered into force as to U.S. Dec. 29, 1970) [hereinafter
New York Convention]; see also 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (implementing the New York Convention) .
4

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

5

Id. at 9.

6

Id. at 10.

7

UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/foreign%20country%20money%20judgments%20recognition/
ufcmjra_final_05.pdf [hereinafter 2005 RECOGNITION ACT] (amending Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act of 1962); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§
481-482 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
8

The 2005 Recognition Act and the Restatement contain provisions authorizing the non-recognition of a
judgment rendered by a court other than the court chosen in a choice of court agreement. See 2005
RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7, at § 4(c)(5) and cmt. 4 (stating that the grounds in § 4 of the 2005
Recognition Act were based on the grounds in the 1962 Recognition Act); RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at §
482 cmt. h.
9

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, opened for signature June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/53483/Part/I-53483-08000002804613e4.pdf
(entered into force Oct. 1, 2015).
10

See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at The Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 101 (2013).
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It simply makes no sense to have multinational reciprocal recognition of a right to
choose private dispute resolution in the form of arbitration, with the corresponding
sovereign enforcement of both that choice and the resulting decision, and not to have
parallel recognition of private party choice of court and of the resulting judgment. Yet
that is the state of affairs in the United States. Thus, while business persons and their
legal counsel acknowledge differences between arbitration and litigation, and
demonstrate preferences for each in international commercial relationships, the ability to
get treatment of choice of court clauses and judgments that is as favorable as the
treatment of arbitration clauses and arbitral decisions is prevented for purely political
reasons having nothing to do with the quality or desirability of the rules found in the
Hague Convention.
In the following discussion, I will first introduce the current status of U.S. law
regarding the recognition and enforcement of arbitral agreements and arbitral awards,
with particular attention to the rules of the New York Convention. I will then discuss the
current status of U.S. law on the recognition and enforcement of choice of court
agreements and foreign judgments resulting from the exercise of jurisdiction in
compliance with such agreements. I will follow with a discussion of the rules found in
the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which would largely bring choice
of court in line with choice of arbitration, providing a level playing field for party choice
of arbitration and litigation.
After consideration of the existing internal law frameworks and treaties for both
arbitration agreements and choice of court agreements, I will discuss two political
matters. The first of these is the set of choices contracting states may make under each of
the New York and Hague Conventions in the form of declarations that mold the contours
of a contracting state’s obligations under each convention. These choices are to be made
by the political branches of government (executive and legislative) in each contracting
state. They are legitimate choices and raise legitimate questions of policy in the treaty
ratification process.
The second political matter in the United States is the impact on the development
of the law which has resulted from claims to state control over treaty obligations in
matters of choice of court and the recognition of foreign judgments. While this too is a
political question, it is one that should not exist in the consideration of U.S. participation
in the Hague Convention. It is—quite simply—only politics. It is time to recognize the
difference between necessary and unnecessary political choices in the ratification of the
Hague Convention, and time to move the United States into the twenty-first century of
private international law through ratification and federal implementation of that
Convention. The Hague Convention offers real advantages for both transaction planning
and dispute resolution processes. U.S. failure to ratify—or even delay in that
ratification—will leave our courts, our legal profession, and our legal system behind the
rest of the world, creating continuing problems for contract drafters, arbitrators, courts,
and the legal sector of the U.S. economy generally.
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A.   The Basic Issue: Choosing a Forum for Dispute Resolution
Parties to international commercial contracts are well advised to include a choice
of forum clause in their agreement in order to increase predictability of the outcome in
the event of any possible dispute. In doing so, they have two basic choices: arbitration
and litigation. The current status of the law regarding these choices differs, however,
leading to a global institutional framework favoring arbitration. The existence of the
New York Convention, with over 150 Contracting States,11 provides greater certainty that
both the choice of an arbitral tribunal and its resulting award will be recognized and
enforced when a dispute arises. This factor alone results in a distinct advantage for
arbitration over litigation.12
Other factors—such as the enhanced availability of interim relief, expanded
evidentiary tools, reduced institutional fees, and a clearer connection between substantive
law and procedural rules—may well make litigation a more attractive dispute settlement
mechanism than arbitration in some international commercial relationships.13 The
unbalanced international legal system often outweighs such factors, however, making
arbitration an easy choice without full consideration of matters which may well otherwise
lead to litigation as a preferable choice.14
This tilted playing field in favor of arbitration in the international legal realm is
beginning to change. With the ratification of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements by the European Union (EU) in 2015, that Convention is now in effect
between twenty-seven of the Member States of the EU and Mexico, offering incentives to
ratification by other states, and setting up a more equal comparison in the choice between
arbitration and choice of court agreements in international commercial contracts.15
11

At the time this article was written, there were 156 Contracting States. See Status: Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York, 1958), UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ arbitration/NYConvention_ status.html (last visited Sept.
28, 2016).
12

For discussion of the choice between arbitration and litigation more broadly, see Ronald A. Brand,
Arbitration or Litigation? Choice of Forum After the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, 57 ANNALS FAC. L. BELGRADE (BELGRADE L. REV.) 23 (2009), available at
http://anali.ius.bg.ac.rs/Annals%202009/Annals%202009%20p%20023-035.pdf. For a discussion of recent
criticisms of arbitration, and a rebuttal, see Peter B. Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in
International Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 49.
13

Brand, supra note 12.

14

Id.

15

While the European Union currently has 28 Member States, Denmark is not bound by the E.U.
ratification of the Convention. Compare Countries, EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/abouteu/countries_en (last visited Sept. 28, 2016), with Members of the Organisation, HAGUE CONF. PRIV. INT’L
L., https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/print/?cid=98 (last visited Sept. 28, 2016).
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B.   The Background for Arbitration
In the United States, arbitration agreements are clearly recognized as “a
specialized kind of forum-selection clause.”16 The enactment of the United States
Arbitration Act in 1925,17 “was designed to allow parties to avoid what was seen as ‘the
costliness and delays of litigation,’ and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same
footing as other contracts,’” “reversing centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements.”18 Section 2 of the Act provides the basic rule that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by
arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal,
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.19
Section 3 of the Act provides for a stay of proceedings in a case where the issue
before a court is arbitrable under the agreement,20 and section 4 directs federal courts to
order parties to arbitrate if there has been a “failure, neglect or refusal” of a party to
honor an agreement to arbitrate.21 The Act demonstrates a clear policy in favor of
enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Sections 9-13 of the Act similarly provide for the
recognition and enforcement of the resulting award.22
The 1958 New York Convention entered into force in the United States on
December 29, 1970.23 The result was an expansion of the rules of the Federal Arbitration
Act to the international realm. Under Article II of the New York Convention, courts in
each contracting state have an obligation to “recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by

16

Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974).

17

United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C.
§§ 1-16 (2016)).
18

Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11.

19

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016).

20

9 U.S.C. § 3.

21

9 U.S.C. § 4.

22

9 U.S.C. §§ 9-13.

23

New York Convention, supra note 3.

24

arbitration.”24 Once an award is rendered, Article III requires that each contracting state
recognize an award granted in another contracting state as binding and enforce the award
just as if it had been rendered domestically.25 These obligations are carried into effect
domestically in Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act.26
The Supreme Court has read the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York
Convention to create a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration. This has had three
significant results in particular. First, very few matters are considered to be nonarbitrable simply because of subject matter public policy.27 Thus, according to the
Supreme Court:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive
protection afforded by a given statute to include protection against
waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be
deducible from text or legislative history. Having made the
bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress
itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial
remedies for the statutory rights at issue. Nothing, in the
meantime, prevents a party from excluding statutory claims from
the scope of an agreement to arbitrate.28
Second, unlike the law in many other countries,29 in the United States, arbitration
law itself is not used to protect groups of “weaker” persons from the deference to
arbitration agreements in otherwise valid contracts. In particular, there are no rules in
U.S. arbitration law carving out special protection for consumers in the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. Thus, for example, in Hill v. Gateway, consumer purchasers of a
computer were held bound to the arbitration clause on page 3 of a “Standard Terms”
document enclosed in the box with the computer, even though they had no chance to
learn of the clause before the computer was ordered, paid for, and delivered, and the
clause called for ICC arbitration that required the party filing a claim for arbitration to
pay administrative fees of $2,000.30

24

Id. art. II.

25

Id. art. III.

26

9 U.S.C. ch. 2 (2016).

27

See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that United
States antitrust law matters were not so imbued with public policy as to prevent their determination by a
panel of three Japanese arbitrators in Japan); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (ordering
arbitration of securities law matters in a “truly international agreement”).
28

Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628.

29

For a comparison of the U.S. and E.U. approaches to the use of private international law restrictions for
the “protection” of consumers, see Ronald A. Brand, Party Autonomy and Access to Justice in the
UNCITRAL Online Dispute Resolution Project, 10 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 11 (2012).
30

Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
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Third, because the policy favoring arbitration is a federal policy, it preempts state
law and thus does not allow state enactment of legislation contrary to the policy.31 The
basics of arbitration law in the United States are found in federal, not state, law.
The result in the United States is a very strong policy favoring arbitration, with an
overlay of international obligations created by the New York Convention. This creates a
significant incentive to draft arbitration agreements in international commercial contracts
where one party is from the United States. And, because it is federal law which is
applied, it is the same law in both state and federal courts and in all states.
III.   RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS

A.   Enforcing Choice of Court Agreements
While jurisprudence on party autonomy in choice of court in the United States has
developed in some ways in parallel with the law of arbitration, it is in other ways a more
recent development. U.S. courts were traditionally jealous of private party decisions to
go to the courts of other states. Thus, until the latter half of the twentieth century, it was
common for courts to hold that “agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to
oust the jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be
enforced.”32 This approach changed in 1972 with the Supreme Court decision in Bremen
v. Zapata.33 The Court enforced a clause choosing the courts in London for dispute
resolution between a German firm and a U.S. company, in a contract for towing an oil rig
from the United States to Italy. In doing so, the Court stated that “[t]he expansion of
American business and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and in our courts.”34 Thus, choice of court clauses “are prima facie valid and should
be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be unreasonable under
the circumstances.”35 While Bremen was brought under federal admiralty jurisdiction, its
results have been consistently applied.
Like the Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration agreements, choice of court
agreements have been found to be binding regardless of the issues that may be addressed
or the parties involved. Thus, for example, in Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, a consumer
from the state of Washington was held bound by a choice of court agreement on the
31

See generally, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc.v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).

32

Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-01 (5th Cir. 1958).

33

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

34

Id. at 9.

35

Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10. While the Bremen case resulted from admiralty jurisdiction, subsequent cases
extended this deference to party choice of forum broadly, even to consumer contracts. See, e.g., Carnival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
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“contract page” of a cruise ticket that provided for all disputes to be litigated in the state
courts of Florida, even though the ticket was not received until after the consumer had
arranged for and paid for the cruise.36
B.   Recognizing Foreign Judgments
The law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United
States is founded on Justice Gray’s 1895 opinion in Hilton v. Guyot.37 While the Hilton
decision rejected recognition of a French judgment against a U.S. defendant on the basis
of a lack of reciprocity,38 it is Justice Gray’s application of the doctrine of comity which
survives.39 Thus, if “a court of competent jurisdiction, conduct[ed] the trial upon regular
proceedings after due citation or voluntary appearance, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice,” and there was no
“fraud in procuring the judgment,”40 then “the merits of the case should not, in an action
brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh.”41
While Justice Gray considered himself to be applying international law,42 and the
decision effectively created a rule of federal common law,43 it developed in the twentieth
36

Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. 585. For a more recent example, see Starkey v. G Adventures, Inc., 796
F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that a choice of court clause was reasonably communicated to a consumer
even though it was available only by clicking on a hyperlink in an email, which led to the full set of terms
and conditions).
37

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

38

Id. at 210-28.

39

According to Justice Gray:

“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor a mere courtesy
and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.
Id. at 163-64
40

Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202.

41

Id. at 203.

42

Id. at 163 (“International law, in its widest and most comprehensive sense—including not only questions
of right between nations, governed by what has been appropriately called the ‘law of nations,’ but also
questions arising under what is usually called ‘private international law,’ or the ‘conflict of laws,’ and
concerning the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of acts, private
or public, done within the dominions of another nation—is part of our law, and must be ascertained and
administered by the courts of justice as often as such questions are presented in litigation between man and
man, duly submitted to their determination.”).
43

19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4514 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2015). (“Because it is clear that there is a ‘federal common law,’
even if not a ‘general federal common law,’ it is not accurate to say that the law of the state is to be applied
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century primarily through state common law and state statutes. Thus, unlike U.S. law on
arbitration,44 the concept of a single body of federal law has not prevailed on matters of
choice of court and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.45 After the
landmark 1938 decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,46 there developed a common law
approach to judgments recognition law among the states, as well as a more recent pair of
uniform acts created by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (Uniform Law Commission or ULC). Currently, about two-thirds of the states
have enacted either the 1962 Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act,47 or
the 2005 Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,48 with the
remaining one-third continuing to rely on common law, reflected in sections 481 and 482
of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.49 Whether it is found in statute or
common law, the basic approach is the same. A foreign judgment, that is final and
binding in the country where it was rendered,50 will be recognized and enforced in a U.S.
court, unless it runs afoul of either the list of mandatory grounds for non-recognition51 or
the discretionary grounds for non-recognition52 found in both the Restatement and the
Uniform Acts.
in all cases except on matters governed by the Constitution or by an Act of Congress.”). For a discussion of
the relationship between federal common law and a statute designed to replace and limit an area of federal
common law, see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). For a discussion focused on
judgments recognition law as federal common law, see Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign MoneyJudgments in the United States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 253, 312-18 (1991) (referring to “Jus Gentium and Federal Common Law: The Lost Legacy of Swift v.
Tyson” (italics added)).
44

See supra Part II.

45

For a more detailed discussion of the development of U.S. law on the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, and its evolution from federal common law to something different, see RONALD A.
BRAND, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION GUIDE: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
OF
FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS
(2012),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/
brandenforce.pdf/$file/brandenforce.pdf; Ronald A. Brand, Understanding Judgments Recognition, 40 N.C.
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 877 (2015); Ronald A. Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments
Recognition Law, 55 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. (forthcoming 2017), earlier version available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2670866.
46

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

47

UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962) [hereinafter 1962
RECOGNITION ACT].
48

2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7.

49

RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, §§ 481-482.

50

2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7, §§ 3(a), 4(a); 1962 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 47, §§ 1(2), 2;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 481.
51

2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(b); 1962 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 47, § 4(a);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 482(1).
52

2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7, § 4(c); 1962 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 47, § 4(b);
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, § 482(2).
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IV.   LEVELING THE PLAYING FIELD FOR CONTRACT DRAFTING: THE HAGUE CONVENTION
ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS

A. The Concerns
From the above discussion, we can draw the following conclusions regarding U.S.
law that are important to the choice between arbitration and litigation when drafting
international commercial contracts:
(1)

Arbitration (including the recognition of arbitration agreements and the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards) is governed by federal law.

(2)

Federal common law provides the historical foundations of the law for both
choice of court agreements,53 and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments.54

(3)

Nonetheless, particularly on the matter of judgments recognition and
enforcement, it has been state law that has most commonly been the source of
applicable rules in the latter half of the twentieth century.

(4)

International arbitration is governed largely by the New York Convention,55
providing greater global uniformity and broader recognition and enforcement of
both agreements to arbitrate and the resulting awards.

(5)

Choice of court agreements and the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments—when governed largely by state law—provide greater opportunity for
divergent rules and, because no global treaty exists, provide significantly reduced
certainty of recognition and enforcement of both the agreement and the resulting
judgment.

(6)

Unless the balance of other factors significantly favors litigation, arbitration
clauses are a much safer option in international commercial contracts than are
choice of court agreements.

In other words, the playing field between arbitration and litigation is unbalanced
and seriously skewed in favor of arbitration.
53

Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).

54

Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).

55

New York Convention, supra note 3.
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B. The Opportunity for Balance: The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements
In 1992, The U.S. State Department proposed to the Hague Conference on Private
International Law the negotiation of a multilateral convention on the recognition and
enforcement of judgments.56 The matter was placed on the agenda of the Hague
Conference in October 1996,57 resulting in a Preliminary Draft Convention text being
produced in October 1999.58 By that time, however, it had become clear that many issues
were beyond easy resolution, and that the convention being considered was more
expansive in scope than anything likely to be achieved. This was most evident after a
Diplomatic Conference held in June 2001, when a new text was filled with bracketed
(yet-to-be-agreed-upon) language and explanatory footnotes.59 The result was a scaleddown effort, focusing on party choice as the only basis of jurisdiction, and resulting in the
2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements.60
While the United States signed the Hague Convention in January of 2009, it has
not yet ratified.61 With the accession of Mexico in 2007 and ratification by the European
Union in 2015, however, the Convention went into effect for Mexico and twenty-seven of
the twenty-eight EU Member States on October 1, 2015.62
56

Letter from Edwin D. Williamson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Georges Droz, Secretary
General, The Hague Conference on Private Int’l Law (May 5, 1992) (distributed with Hague Conference
document L.c. ON No. 15 (1992)).
57

HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, FINAL ACT OF THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION WITH THE
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION, APPLICABLE LAW, RECOGNITION, ENFORCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION IN
RESPECT OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CHILDREN, AND DECISION
ON MATTERS PERTAINING TO THE AGENDA OF THE CONFERENCE pt. B.1, 34 I.L.M. 1391, 1405 (19 Oct.
1996).
58

See generally HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, INFORMATIONAL NOTE ON THE WORK OF THE
INFORMAL MEETINGS HELD SINCE OCTOBER 1999 TO CONSIDER AND DEVELOP DRAFTS ON OUTSTANDING
ITEMS, Preliminary Doc. No. 15 (May 15, 2001), https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm_pd15e.pdf
(containing the text of the Preliminary Draft Convention).
59

HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF THE DISCUSSION IN
COMMISSION II OF THE FIRST PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE 6 (June 20, 2001),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf.
60

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9; see generally Choice of Court Section,
HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/specialised-sections/choice-of-court (last visited
Oct. 2, 2016) (text of the Convention and documentary history of the Choice of Court Convention project).
61

See Status Table: Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, HCCH,
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98 (updated June 2, 2016) [hereinafter
Status Table].
62

See id. Denmark is the exception to full effect within the EU. The EU ratification included the following
notification:
The European Community declares, in accordance with Article 30 of the Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, that it exercises competence over all the matters governed by this Convention. Its Member
States will not sign, ratify, accept or approve the Convention, but shall be bound by the Convention by
virtue of its conclusion by the European Community. For the purpose of this declaration, the term
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The Hague Convention contains three basic rules:
(1)

Article 5 provides that a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement
shall have exclusive jurisdiction;63

(2)

Article 6 provides that a court not chosen shall defer to the chosen court;64 and

(3)

Article 8 provides that the courts of all contracting states shall recognize and
enforce judgments from a court chosen in an exclusive choice of court agreement,
subject to an explicit list of bases for non-recognition found in Article 9.65

In effect, the Hague Convention is the litigation counterpart to the New York
Convention. However, because it so far has effect in only 29 states (and not internally
among the 27 Member States of the European Union), compared to the 150+ Contracting
States for the New York Convention, it is not a functionally equivalent legal instrument
at this point. It is, however, worth comparing its provisions to those found in the New
York Convention in order to determine the relative comparative impact if and when the
Hague Convention draws an effectively comparable body of Contracting States.
V.   THE PRIVATE CHOICE: ARBITRATION OR LITIGATION

A.   The Agreement: Comparing the Applicable Rules
The choice of forum rules contained in the New York Convention are found in
Article II, which creates an obligation to recognize and enforce agreements to arbitrate,66
"European Community" does not include Denmark by virtue of Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the
position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community.
Declaration/Reservation/Notification, HCCH, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/statustable/notifications/?csid=1044&disp=resdn (last visited Oct. 2, 2016). The Convention entered into force
as to Singapore on October 1, 2016, bringing the number of states party to the Convention to twenty-nine.
Status Table, supra note 61.
63

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 5.

64

Id. art. 6.

65
66

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, arts. 8-9.
Article II provides:

1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to
submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in respect
of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of
settlement by arbitration.
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so long as the agreement concerns “a subject matter capable of settlement by
arbitration,”67 and the agreement is not otherwise “null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed.”68
The comparable rules of the Hague Convention are contained in Articles 3
through 6.69 Article 3(a) defines the applicable exclusive choice of court agreement as an
agreement to submit disputes to “the courts of one Contracting State or one or more
specific courts of one Contracting state to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other
courts.”70 Article 3(b) deems choice of court agreements to be exclusive “unless the
parties have expressly provided otherwise.”71 Article 5(1) provides that a court “of a
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall have
jurisdiction . . . unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.”72 Such
a court “shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be
decided in a court of another State,”73 but such an agreement cannot affect internal rules
on subject matter jurisdiction, the value of the claim, or the internal allocation of
jurisdiction among the courts of that Contracting State.74 Article 6 then provides the
accompanying rule for all other courts, obligating courts of a Contracting State not
chosen by the parties to “suspend or dismiss proceedings” to which the choice of court
agreement applies, unless the agreement is null and void, a party lacked capacity to
conclude the agreement, there would be a violation of public policy, the agreement
cannot be performed, or the chosen court has declined to hear the case.75

2. The term "agreement in writing" shall include an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.
3. The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties
have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer
the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed.
New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II.
67

Id. art. II(1).

68

Id. art. II(3).

69

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, arts. 3-6.

70

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 3(a).

71

Id. art. 3(b).

72

Id. art. 5(1).

73

Id. art. 5(2).

74

Id. art. 5(2).

75

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 6.
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B.   Enforcement of the Forum Choice: The Crucial Issues
Any choice of forum agreement, whether selecting arbitration or litigation, must
be considered in light of four basic issues:
(1)

Consent. Does a choice of forum agreement exist—have the parties effectively
consented to the choice of forum?

(2)

Formal validity. Is the choice of forum agreement formally valid—does it meet
the formal requirements set out in the law?

(3)

Substantive validity. Is the choice of forum agreement substantively valid—
does it run afoul of prohibitions placed on the parties’ ability to enter the
agreement?

(4)

Scope and exclusivity. What is the effective scope of the choice of forum
agreement—are there limitations due to party intent which circumscribe the scope
and effect of the agreement?

Determining the answer to each of these questions requires first that one apply
rules of private international law in order to know what law governs each determination,
and whether that law allows party choice to adjust the otherwise applicable rule. This
requires a four-step process:
(1)

determining the rule of applicable law;

(2)

applying that choice of law rule in order to determine the governing rule of
substantive law;

(3)

determining the effect of the substantive law rule; and

(4)

determining whether the substantive law rule may be changed by party agreement.

The following chart catalogues the conflict of laws rules resulting from the
application of the New York and Hague Conventions for purposes of considering each of
the four issues noted above, which must be considered in selecting the choice of
arbitration or litigation.76

76

The discussion which follows builds on the author’s prior work in RONALD A. BRAND & PAUL M.
HERRUP, THE 2005 HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 19-21, 78-82 (2008), and
Ronald A. Brand, Consent, Validity, and Choice of Forum Agreements in International Contracts, in LIBER
AMICORUM HUBERT BOCKEN 541 (I. Boone, I. Claeys & L. Lavrysen eds., 2009).
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Consent/Existence
Formal Validity

New York Convention
Outside the Convention
Article II (autonomous
Convention Rules)

Article II(3) (“null and void”
determined by application of
Substantive Validity
national law, including rules of
applicable law)
Scope

Interpretation of the clause
under applicable national law

Hague Convention
Outside the Convention
Article 3 (autonomous
Convention Rules)
Articles 5, 6, and 9
(autonomous Convention
Rules for determining
applicable national law,
including rules of applicable
law)
Interpretation of the clause
under applicable national law

1.   Consent to the Choice Forum Agreement
Neither the New York Convention nor the Hague Convention has a rule for
determining whether there is in fact an agreement, i.e., whether the parties have
consented to dispute resolution in the forum stated. That is as it should be. This is a
matter of substantive contract law, and is to be determined by the contract law rules
determined to apply in accordance with the relevant choice of law rules. For example, if
the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) is
applicable,77 then its rules of contract formation will apply. Similarly, if the parties are
both from European Union Member States, then the rules of the Rome I Regulation
would apply to determine the applicable law—including Article 4, which allows the
question to be governed by the law chosen by the parties.78
The important point here is, if the applicable law operates to determine that no
choice of forum agreement has been formed, then no further analysis is necessary. Both
the New York and Hague Conventions apply only when there is an “agreement” to the
relevant chosen forum.79
2.   Formal Validity of the Choice of Forum Agreement
Each of the two Conventions has rules of formal validity. Thus, Article II(1) of
the New York Convention requires that there be “an agreement in writing under which
the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or

77

See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 1, Apr. 11, 1980,
1489 U.N.T.S. 58.
78

Commission Regulation 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the
Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), art. 4, 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6, 11.
79

See Brand, supra note 76, at 541 (the question of which forum, court or arbitral tribunal, determines
whether a choice of forum agreement has been formed and is a separate issue).
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which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship.”80 Article II(2)
further elaborates by providing that “[t]he term ‘agreement in writing’ shall include an
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or contained
in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”81 These requirements have created problems in
an age of electronic communication,82 but nonetheless continue to exist given the extreme
difficulty in amending a treaty to which there are over 150 parties.83
Similar requirements are found in Article 3(a) of the Hague Convention, which
defines an “exclusive choice of court agreement” as
an agreement concluded by two or more parties that meets the
requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the purpose of
deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection
with a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting
State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State to the
exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts;84
Article 3(c) then requires that
an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded or
documented –
i) in writing; or
ii) by any other means of communication which renders
information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent
reference.85
This makes the substantive validity rules of the two Conventions relatively
similar. While the Hague Convention applies only to exclusive choice of court
agreements, this is replicated in the fact that it is difficult to find a non-exclusive
arbitration agreement. Both Conventions require a writing, or equivalent method of
rendering the agreement accessible for evidentiary purposes. If these requirements are
not met, then the agreement is not formally valid.

80

New York convention, supra note 3, art. II(1).

81

Id. art. II(2).

82

See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Recommendation Regarding the Interpretation of Article II,
Paragraph 2, and Article VII, Paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. A/61/17 (July 7, 2006). http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbit
ration/NY-conv/A2E.pdf.
83

See United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts art.
20, U.N. Doc. A/60/17 (July 2005), http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/electcom/0657452_Ebook.pdf.
84

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 3(a).

85

Id. art. 3(c).
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3.   Substantive Validity of the Choice of Forum Agreement
One of the key differences between the New York and Hague Conventions is the
insertion of an autonomous choice of law rule for purposes of determining substantive
validity, found in articles 5(1), 6(a), and 9(a) of the Hague Convention.86 Thus, while
both Conventions provide that a court need not honor a choice of forum agreement that is
“null and void,” the Hague Convention provides a specific rule regarding what law is to
be applied to determine whether an agreement is null or void.87 All courts are to apply
the law of the state of the chosen forum.88 This includes the application of the choice of
law rules of that state.89
Thus, if the chosen court considers that the law of another State should be applied
under its choice-of-law rules, it will apply that law. This could occur, for example, where
under the choice-of-law rules of the chosen court, the validity of the choice of court
agreement is decided by the law governing the contract as a whole—for example, the law
designated by the parties in a choice-of-law clause.90
The New York Convention has no such rule on law applicable to the
determination of agreement validity, thus leaving the matter to the conflict of laws rules
of the forum seised with the matter.91
4.   Effectiveness of the Choice of Forum Agreement
The determination of the effect—largely the issue of scope—of a choice of forum
agreement is generally factual and not legal. However, to the extent that it is a question
of construction of contract language, with the goal of determining the intent of the
parties, then contract formation rules for determining party intent are relevant. In that
regard, the same concerns about the applicable law of contract formation which govern
the question of consent to (existence of) the agreement will apply. While the doctrine of
separability determines that a choice of forum agreement must be considered separately
from the core contract for purposes of measuring consent, formal validity, substantive
validity, and effect/scope, that does not change the applicable law.
There is a line of cases that considers specific words commonly used in choice of
forum agreements in order to determine scope, and they are worth some mention here.
The earlier cases in that line tended to make stark distinctions based on word choices,
86

Id. arts. 5(1), 6(a), 9(a).

87

Id.

88

Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, supra note 9, art. 3(a).

89

TREVOR HARTLEY & MASATO DOGAUCHI, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, CONVENTION OF
30 JUNE 2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS: EXPLANATORY REPORT ¶ 125 (2007),
https://assets.hcch.net/upload/expl37final.pdf.
90

Id.

91

For further elaboration on the substantive validity issue, and on how it must not be confused with the rule
of consent/existence, see BRAND & HERRUP, supra note 76, at 20.
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finding different intent behind phrases such as “arising under” and “arising out of” the
agreement.92 More recent cases, however, have eschewed such distinctions on the
assumption that
there is no rational basis upon which businessmen would be likely
to wish to have questions of the validity or enforceability of the
contract decided by one tribunal and questions about its
performance decided by another, one would need to find very clear
language before deciding that they must have had such an
intention.93
The second rationale for such an approach is one of predictability:
The proposition that any jurisdiction or arbitration clause in an
international commercial contract should be liberally construed
promotes legal certainty. It serves to underline the golden rule that
if the parties wish to have issues as to the validity of their contract
decided by one tribunal and issues as to its meaning or
performance decided by another, they must say so expressly.
Otherwise they will be taken to have agreed on a single tribunal for
the resolution of all such disputes.94
The principal lesson of these cases seems to be that there is now a general
presumption of broad scope of choice of forum agreements, and that any desire for
limitations on scope should be clearly expressed.

92

See, e.g., Heyman v. Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356 (HL) 399 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“arising under” has
a narrower meaning than “arising out of”). See also Overseas Union Insurance Ltd. v. AA Mutual
International Ins. Co. Ltd. [1988] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 63 (QB) 67 (Evans, J.) (Eng.) (finding a broad distinction
between agreements covering “only those disputes which may arise regarding the rights and obligations
which are created by the contract itself” and those covering “some wider class or classes of disputes”).
93

Premium Nafta Products, Ltd. v. Fili Shipping Co. Ltd., [2007] UKHL 40, [7] (appeal taken from Eng.).

94

Id. at [26] (Lord Hope of Craighead). Similar approaches have been taken in the United States, Australia,
and Germany. See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (in absence
of express exclusion of a particular issue, presumption favored its inclusion); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (clause providing that “all disputes, controversies or
differences which may arise . . . out of or in relation to” the contract included claims of violation of U.S.
antitrust law, even where arbitration was to be in Japan, by Japanese arbitrators); Comandate Marine Corp.
v. Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd., [2006] FCAFC 192 (20 December 2006) ¶ 165 (Austl.) (finding a
commercial presumption that parties do not intend to have disputes from their transaction heard in two
places, particularly in an international market); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb.
27, 1970, 6 ARB. INT’L 79, 1990 (Ger.) (“There is every reason to presume that reasonable parties will wish
to have the relationships created by their contract and the claims arising therefrom, irrespective of whether
their contract is effective or not, decided by the same tribunal and not by two different tribunals.”).
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C.   The Decision: Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards and
Judgments
While the basic rules of the Hague Convention are very similar to existing U.S.
law on the recognition and enforcement of judgments (now found in the 1962 and 2005
Uniform Acts and the Restatement),95 current law cannot guarantee the reciprocal effect
that will result in the recognition and enforcement of U.S. judgments in other countries.
That would be a significant benefit of the Convention for U.S. parties engaging in
international commercial contracts.
If the Hague Convention should become widely ratified, then those who draft
international commercial contracts will need to consider the innate benefits and
disadvantages of each of arbitration and litigation, as well as any differences built in to
the system of recognition and enforcement found in the New York and Hague
Conventions. That makes it worthwhile at this point to consider the differences on this
matter between the two Conventions.
In the New York Convention, Article III requires that each “Contracting State
shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules
of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon.”96 The counterpart in the
Hague Convention is Article 8, which requires that a “judgment given by a court of a
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall be
recognised and enforced in other Contracting States.”97
The bases for non-recognition of an arbitration award under the New York
Convention are found in Article V, which allows a court to refuse recognition upon a
finding of lack of party capacity; of lack of proper notice; of a decision outside the scope
of the agreement to arbitrate; of improper arbitration procedure; that an award is not yet
binding, or has been set aside; that the subject matter “is not capable of settlement by
arbitration;” or that recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of
the recognizing state.98 The similar limitations on recognition of a judgment under the
Hague Convention are found in its Article 9, which provides for non-recognition if the
agreement was null and void; a party lacked capacity to enter the agreement; there was a
lack of proper notice; the judgment was obtained by fraud; recognition would be
“manifestly incompatible with public policy;” or there exists either an inconsistent local
judgment or an inconsistent earlier judgment from another state.99

95

See 2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7; 1962 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 47; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 7.
96

New York Convention, supra note 3, art. III.

97

Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 8.

98

New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.

99

Hague Convention, supra note 9, art. 9.
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These differences are compared in the following chart:
New York Convention
Rule (Article III):
Arbitral awards will be recognized and
enforced
Exceptions (Article V):
•  lack of party capacity
•  lack of proper notice
•  outside the scope of the agreement to
arbitrate
•  improper arbitration procedure
•  award is not yet binding, or has been set
aside
•  subject matter “is not capable of
settlement by arbitration”
•  contrary to public policy

Hague Convention
Rule (Article 8):
Judgments will be recognized and
enforced
Exceptions (Article 9):
•  agreement was “null and void”
•  lack of party capacity
•  lack of proper notice
•  judgment “obtained by fraud”
•  manifestly incompatible with public
policy
•  inconsistent with local judgment
•  inconsistent with earlier judgment

Each Convention includes a list reasonably comparable to the national law of
states regarding bases for non-recognition of foreign judgments. The comparison
provides no significant differences, with the public policy ground for non-recognition
contributing the safeguard in each list.
VI.   THE PUBLIC CHOICE: DECLARATIONS IN THE PROCESS OF TREATY RATIFICATION
Each of the New York and Hague Conventions also provides Contracting State
choices to be made at the time of ratification. The following chart demonstrates those
choices:
New York Convention Declarations:1
Article I(3): “any State may on the basis
of reciprocity declare that it will apply the
Convention to the recognition and
enforcement of awards made only in the
territory of another Contracting State. It
may also declare that it will apply the
Convention only to differences arising out
of legal relationships, whether contractual
or not, which are considered as
commercial under the national law of the
State making such declaration.”
1

New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(3).

2

Hague Convention, supra note 9, arts. 19-21.

Hague Convention Declarations:2
Article 19: refusal to determine disputes
unrelated to the forum
Article 20: refusal to recognize or enforce
judgments on domestic matters
Article 21: declaration of reciprocal
exclusion from scope
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Here, the choices available are very different in each Convention, but those
choices reflect the special attributes of each type of dispute resolution. In the New York
Convention, only two declarations are available.
VII.  THE TROUBLING POLITICAL QUESTION: MISGUIDED FEDERALISM
CONVENTION

AND THE

HAGUE

Both choice of court and the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
have received a great deal of attention in legal circles in the early twenty-first century.
While the external rules were being negotiated in the form of a treaty in The Hague, both
the American Law Institute (ALI) and the Uniform Law Commissioners were busy
dealing with internal rules in the United States. In 2005, the same year in which the
Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements was completed, the ULC completed
its revision of the 1962 Uniform Act, the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
Recognition Act (2005 Recognition Act).1 Also in 2005, the ALI completed its proposed
federal statute on the recognition and enforcement of judgments.2 The ALI project called
for the return to federalization of the law of foreign judgments recognition. In reaching
that result, the ALI specifically found that (1) the federal government has the authority
“as inherent in the sovereignty of the nation, or as derived from the national power over
foreign relations shared by Congress and the Executive, or as derived from the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations,”3 to govern the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, and (2) “a coherent federal statute is the best solution” for addressing
“a national problem with a national solution.”4
While the ALI Federal Statute and the ULC’s 2005 Recognition Act contained
very similar substantive rules, they presented two very different views of what the source
of judgments recognition law should be in the United States. Federal legislation under
the ALI approach would be state statutes under the ULC approach. This variance in
approach was accentuated by the ULC’s 2012 draft of a Uniform Choice of Court
Agreements Convention Implementation Act.5
The different approaches to the source of the law were taken up in the State
Department, when Harold Koh, then the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State,
convened an informal working group under the auspices of the American Society of
International Law to consider how the United States might implement the Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements. The group included representatives from
both the ALI and the ULC. The working group discussed whether consensus could be

1

2005 RECOGNITION ACT, supra note 7.

2

AM. LAW INST., RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED
FEDERAL STATUTE (2006).
3

Id. at 3.

4

Id. at 6.

5

UNIF. CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/choice_of_court/2012am_ccaia_approvedtext.pdf.
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reached on a form of implementation referred to as “cooperative federalism,” in which a
uniform act for the states would be combined with federal legislation.6
When the informal working group failed to resolve the differences in approach,
the Legal Adviser prepared a memorandum in which he concluded that implementation
of the Convention in a manner similar to that used for the New York Convention in the
Federal Arbitration Act presented “the most promising way forward.”7 The process of
U.S. ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention has moved no further
since that memorandum was issued in January of 2013. It has remained clear that any
effort to seek implementation through federal statute alone would be met with ULC
efforts to prevent Senate advice and consent.8
This failure of the United States to move forward with the Hague Convention has
a number of important implications, both at home and abroad, and in regard to both
governmental and private party decision-making. They include the following:
(1)

On the national level, the law on choice of court remains mostly a result of federal
case law, while the law on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
is generally governed by state law. This separates the two parts of the Hague
Convention in a way that presents both non-uniformity and potential confusion.

6

The author was a member of the informal working group. The position of the Legal Adviser following
these meetings is recorded in HAROLD HONGJU KOH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, MEMORANDUM OF THE LEGAL
ADVISER REGARDING UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF
COURT AGREEMENTS (COCA) 3-4 (2013), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/206865.pdf.
7

Id.

8

One specialized area of judgments recognition law has been the source of both state and federal
legislation. In 2008, New York enacted its Libel Terrorism Protection Act, in response to concerns
regarding foreign libel judgments, particularly from the United Kingdom. Libel Terrorism Protection Act,
2008 N.Y. Laws 66. See generally Marissa Gerny, Note, The SPEECH Act Defends the First Amendment: A
Visible and Targeted Response to Libel Tourism, 36 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 409, 410-13, 432-33 (2012)
(describing background of New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act). That Act added a paragraph (d) to
the rules on personal jurisdiction found in N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 to specifically provide for jurisdiction “to
the fullest extent permitted by the United States constitution,” in order to allow parties otherwise subject to
jurisdiction in New York to bring an action for a negative declaratory judgment to prevent the recognition
or enforcement of a foreign defamation judgment. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(d) (McKinney 2009). The New York
statute was followed on the federal level when, on August 10, 2010, President Obama signed into law the
Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act., Pub. L.
No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2480 (2010) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (2016)). The SPEECH Act
similarly prevents recognition and enforcement of foreign libel judgments and allows preemptive
declaratory judgments against recognition. Section 4102(a)(1) provides that
a domestic court shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defamation unless the domestic court
determines that(A) the defamation law applied in the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least as much protection for
freedom of speech and press in that case as would be provided by the first amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which the domestic court is located . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1) (2016).
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(2)

Again on the national level, the law of recognition and enforcement of judgments,
while largely found in two Uniform Acts and the Restatement, is subject to
important differences from state-to-state, creating unpredictability, unnecessary
forum shopping, and sometimes inequitable results.9

(3)

On the international front, a focus on judgments recognition has continued at the
Hague Conference on Private International Law, where a special commission
completed a preliminary draft of a convention on the recognition and enforcement
of judgments in civil and commercial matters in June 2016.10

(4)

Also on the international front, as discussed above,11 the 2005 Hague Convention
has gone into effect between the European Union, Mexico, and Singapore. This is
likely to draw additional ratifications,12 leading to broader effect for the
Convention—without the United States.

Each of these implications of the current status of choice of court and judgments
recognition law has significant impact on private party choice between arbitration and
litigation. So long as the legal framework for both choice of court and the recognition of
foreign judgments remains less predictable and more diffused than does the legal
framework for the recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements and foreign
arbitral awards, parties to international commercial contracts will continue to be drawn to
arbitration over litigation. As one commentator has explained:
It’s probably only a matter of time before the rest of the world
lines up for easy reciprocal enforcement with the nations of
Europe. Once that happens, a court judgment from London will be
more valuable than one from New York. For if clients from Asia or
Latin America can sue anywhere, which would they rather have in
their back pockets? Deal lawyers drafting the dispute-resolution
clause in international contracts are sure to take note. And U.S.
litigators, having spent the past decade watching their global

9

See Ronald A. Brand, Understanding Judgments Recognition, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 877
(2015).
10

See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, SPECIAL COMM’N ON THE RECOGNITION AND
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business flow to arbitration, may be chagrined to see more of it
diverted to the Royal Courts of Justice.13
Moreover, implementation of the Choice of Court Convention as contemplated
under the Uniform Choice of Court Agreements Convention Implementation Act could
well result in the inclusion of arbitration clauses in an even higher percentage of
international commercial contracts than is now the case when those contracts involve one
party from the United States. As noted above, the balance of the law clearly weighs in
favor of arbitration at the current time, and the 2005 Hague Convention is intended in
part to change that balance. The Uniform Act approach to implementation would,
however, result in any U.S. party drafting a choice of court clause in an international
contract being required to consider three separate—and not entirely uniform—texts: the
Convention, the federal implementing statute, and the Uniform Act as enacted in the
relevant state. Given that the ULC insisted on changing some of the language agreed
upon in The Hague with our treaty partners, there is a serious and significant risk of nonuniform interpretation, and a near certainty of increased litigation costs resulting just
from consideration of the governing texts. One might even be excused for suggesting
that including a choice of court clause in an international commercial contract under such
circumstances would border on malpractice given the increased uncertainty of results for
the client.
VIII.   CONCLUSION
The current status of the law creates clear incentives for including arbitration
clauses rather than choice of court clauses in international commercial contracts to which
one party is from the United States. That imbalance could be reduced dramatically
through U.S. ratification and implementation of the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements. To date, no constituency has come out against ratification and
implementation of the Convention. Wide ratification on a global basis would also help to
prevent the current difference between a liberal reception of foreign judgments in the
United States and a less hospitable reception of U.S. judgments in many countries.
While the New York Convention and the Hague Convention have some
differences in regard to rules on formal and substantive validity of the relevant choice of
forum agreements to which they are addressed, they provide reasonably similar regimes
for respecting party autonomy by encouraging the recognition and enforcement of both
the agreement choosing the forum and the resulting decision rendered in that forum.
As with the New York Convention, the Hague Convention requires each
Contracting State to make certain political decisions at the time of ratification and
implementation in determining whether or not to exercise the relevant declarations
allowed under each Convention. While the available declarations differ between the two
Conventions, in neither case do they change the basic structure and operation of the
Convention. They are intended to be limited in scope and effect, and it is likely that their
13
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use will be consistent with the intended limitations.
The United States runs the risk of being left behind in the world of judgments
recognition if it does not move to ratification and implementation of the Hague
Convention in the relatively near term. Already, countries like Singapore and the United
Arab Emirates have begun to create commercial courts designed to become magnets for
international commercial disputes.14 Whether they will be able to eclipse traditional
judicial dispute resolution centers like London and New York remains to be seen.
Regardless of their impact, it seems certain that, if a significant number of states become
parties to the Hague Convention, those who draft international commercial contracts and
prefer litigation over arbitration are likely to be inclined to place that litigation in London
rather than New York or any other U.S. location.
The current political climate in the United States has had many negative results.
It would be unfortunate if one more result was to prevent effective ratification and federal
implementation of the Hague Convention. Nonetheless, at this point it appears quite
likely that political differences will prevent the availability of effective private choice in
selecting among dispute resolution forums for international commercial contracts.
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